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The First Amendment,
Gaming Advertisements, and
Congressional Inconsistency:
The Future of the Commercial
Speech Doctrine after Greater
New Orleans Broadeasting
Ass'n v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial speech doctrine is the stepchild of first amendment
jurisprudence: Liberals don't much like commercial speech because it's
commercial; conservatives mistrust it because it's speech. Yet, in a free
market economy, the ability to give and receive information about
commercial matters may be as important, sometimes more important,
than expression of a political, artistic, or religious nature. 2
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech." 3
One cannot doubt the importance of this declaration against the vicissitudes
in American history. Since its enactment through the Bill of Rights in 1791, the
First Amendment has served not only as a catalyst in the evolution of American
culture but also as a rooted concept of American democracy. While the First
Amendment continues to characterize the United States as a social and political
institution, commercial advertising has served to define the United States as an
economic institution. Capitalism and the free-market thrive on the notion of
uninhibited access to all information. 4 Only then can a consumer make a wellinformed economic decision amongst varying alternatives. 5
Although capitalism characterizes the United States as a nation, the Supreme
Court has never fully endorsed equating the rationale behind the First Amendment

1. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
2. Alex Koziniski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of CommercialSpeech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627,652
(1990).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE & DECISIONS 3-20 (1980) (describing the role of
knowledge, ideas, and decisions and how they are influenced by social institutions).
5. See id.

as fully protecting commercial advertising.6 In the beginning, the Supreme Court
resisted considering commercial speech as deserving any First Amendment
protection. Over the years, the Supreme Court has gradually balanced the
interests of both concepts by extending the reach of the First Amendment to
include some commercial speech. A doctrine of commercial speech has emerged
and continued to evolve to maintain this balance. Meanwhile, as the United
States progressed from a regional, to a national, to a global economy, Congress
has found the pervasiveness of commercial speech an important potential
alternative to regulating commerce without directly regulating the underlying
conduct of a business. 7 Thus, competing interests and uncertain Supreme Court
decisions have developed to complicate the breadth of the commercial speech

doctrine!
This Note explores the Court's decision in GreaterNew Orleans Broadcast-

ing Ass'n v. United States9 and discusses the implications of the Court's
determination that the First Amendment permits lawful casinos to broadcast
truthful, non-misleading gaming advertisements. 10 Part II provides an introduction into the development of the commercial speech doctrine," examines
Congress' inconsistency in regulating gaming advertisements, 12 and traces lower
courts' treatment of the CentralHudson test as it applies to such advertisements. 3
Part III presents the facts and procedural history of GreaterNew Orleans 4 and is
followed by an analysis of the majority and concurring opinions in Part IV.' 5 Part
V considers GreaterNew Orleans'judicial, legislative, and social impact. 6 Part
6. Dana M. Shelton, Recent Development, 70 TuL. L. REV. 1725, 1725-26 (1996). "The rationale
underlying the disparate treatment ofcommercial speech is founded on the idea that, unlike political peech,
commercial speech is not essential to the maintenance of a legitimate, viable democracy and an informed,
active public." Id. (citing ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 55 (1985)); see also Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 784-87 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.., dissenting)
(stating that although economic efficiency is an important interest, such an interest does not necessarily
transform it into a First Amendment interest).
7. See William D. O'Neill, Note, GovernmentalRestrictionson BeverageAlcohoAdvertisingAfter
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 267,267 (1998). Interestingly, Congress need only
provide a rational basis to regulate the underlying conduct of a business, as opposed to a much more
demanding burden with regards to the advertising of such conduct. See e.g., United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (providing that regulatory legislation regarding commerce need only
satisfy a rational basis). The attractiveness of regulating advertising, however, appears to lie in the
inconsistency of the Court to determine a concrete standard in regulating commercial speech and the
pervasiveness of advertising as a tool for dictating and influencing consumer choice. Daniel E. Troy,
Advertising: Not a "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 89, 142 (1999) [hereinafter "Troy,
Advertising"].
8. See Troy, Advertising, supra note 7, at 142.
9. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
10. See id. at 176.
1I. See infra notes 18-113 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 114-128 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 129-141 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-158 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 159-202 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 203-248 and accompanying text.
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VI concludes with an overview of the commercial speech doctrine in light of the
Court's decision in GreaterNew Orleans.17
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

A. Originsof Commercial Speech
As a general matter, traditional First Amendment jurisprudence delineates
speech restrictions into two categories: content-based and content-neutral
abridgements. " Content-based abridgements are presumptively unconstitutional.' 9 When analyzing content-based abridgements, unless a more specific,
well-settled analysis is applicable,2 °the Court utilizes a strict scrutiny, compelling
state interest standard of review. 21 This demanding analysis requires the
government to demonstrate that the abridgement under review is narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling state interest. 22 Content-neutral abridgements, on the other
hand, involve less demanding judicial scrutiny,23 because such abridgements
originate from an indirect, rather than direct burden on the First Amendment. 24
In analyzing content-neutral restrictions, the Court utilizes a balancing test,
weighing the-non-speech interests against the right to free speech to determine if
the First Amendment abridgement is reasonable. 25
Commercial speech, however, is not easily reconcilable with traditional First
Amendment jurisprudential scrutiny. The First Amendment has not traditionally
embraced commercial speech.26 In 1942, the Supreme Court in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, in merely three pages, established an outright distinction between
17. See infra Part VI, note 249 and accompanying text.
18. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene speech analysis); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (clear and present danger speech analysis); N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (defamatory speech analysis); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words
analysis).
21. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v, Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 US 37, 45-46 (1983) (requiring a
showing of compelling state interest to uphold the constitutionality of a content-based regulation limiting
access to interschool mail systems).
22. Id. See generally LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrurONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the distinction between content-neutral (noncommunicative impact) and content-based
(communicative impact) First Amendment abridgements).
23. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 791-92.
24. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791-92 (1989).
25. Id. at 792-803; see generally TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 791-92 (describing the distinction
between content-neutral (noncommunicative impact) and content-based (communicative impact) First

Amendment abridgements).
26.

See, e.g. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).

commercial and non-commercial speech. 27 The Court, "without citing precedent,
historical evidence, or policy considerations, '' 28 relegated commercial speech,
which included advertising, outside of the scope of the First Amendment. 29

The idea that anything "commercial" falls completely outside the First
Amendment appeared to change in 1943.30 In that year, the Supreme Court in
3
Murdock v. Pennsylvaniaprotected door-to-door selling of religious materials. '
The Court indicated that a city "may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in
the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the
purchase of books. 32 Murdock limited a broad application of Chrestensen by
providing that the exercise of the First Amendment could not be circumscribed
simply because of an incidental commercial aspect. 33 Moreover, in 1964, the
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan34 found an advertisement informing
southern Negro students of their constitutional rights, accompanied by an appeal
for funds, was still within the purview of the First Amendment. 35 The Court
asserted that simply because the advertisement was a paid advertisement and
solicited funds did not bar it from First Amendment protection.36 Although the
Court maintained that a commercial advertisement could fall under the First
Amendment, the Court stopped short of overruling Chrestensen and treading new
ground. 37 Both Murdock and New York Times revealed the Court's evolving
27. Id. at 54-55. In Chrestensen, the plaintiffsought to enjoin the police commissioner from enforcing
a city ordinance forbidding the distribution of commercial handbills on city streets. Id. at 53. Moreover,
after the plaintiff learned he was barred from distributing handbills soliciting patrons for a tour of his
submarine, he distributed the handbills once again with his advertisement on one side, without a mention
of admission price, and a message on the other side protesting the City's denial of wharfage facilities. Id.
Although the flip side of the plaintiff's handbill most likely demonstrated pure First Amendment protected
speech, the Court focused on the motive in making its determination that commercial speech lies outside
of the protections of the First Amendment. Id. at 55.
28. Martin H. Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values
of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429,450 (1971).
29. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54-55. "[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54.
30. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
31. Id.at 106, 111, 116.
32. Id. at 11. "The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the
protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine
were not distributed free of charge." Id.
33. Id. "Although Murdock did limit somewhat the reach of the Chrestensen doctrine it left unclear
how a court should determine the 'primary purpose' of a communication." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrurbONAL LAW § 16.28 n.7 (4th ed. 199 1).
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. Id. at 256-57, 265-66.
36. Id. at 266. "That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this
connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold." Id.
37. Id. at 266. Instead, the Court maintained that
[t]he publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in which the word was
used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.
Id. As opposed to Murdock, the Court in New York Times appeared to disregard the motive of the
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distinction regarding the quality of commercial speech: purely commercial
speech vs. commercial speech purporting to further a redeemable interest. 38
The Supreme Court grappled with distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech again in 1973.' 9 In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission of Human Relations, the Court officially put to rest the proposition

that commercial speech hinged on the motivation of the speaker. 40 The Court
instead placed the emphasis on content. 4' In particular, the Court indicated its
disfavor of speech that advocated an illegal commercial activity-employment
discrimination based on sex.42 Moreover, in 1978, the Court in National Society

of Professional Engineers v. United States43 similarly indicated its disfavor of
speech that promoted an illegal commercial activity. 4 Again, although no set
standard evolved to determine what actually constitutes commercial speech, the

Court's determinations in individual cases began to provide examples of what was
not commercial speech.
In 1975, the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia46 made a significant contribution in
the quest for deciphering commercial speech. The Bigelow Court struck down a

state statute that made it a misdemeanor to advertise, and allegedly encourage,
abortion. 47 In refusing to uphold-the statute that prohibited an advertisement
accurately pertaining to lawful, yet socially controversial conduct, 48 the Court
commercial advertisement in determining the reach of the First Amendment. See NOWAK, supra note 33,
§ 16.29. Instead, the Court focused more on the content of the advertisement rather than its purpose. Id.
38. Bernard James, Can the Federal Government Continue to Ban Truthful, Nonmisleading
Broadcastsof Casino Gambling Ads?, 1999 PREVIEW U.S. SuP. CT. CAS. 414,415 (1999).
39. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
40. Jason Edward Lavender, Note, "Tobacco is a Filthy Weed and From the Devil Doth Proceed":
A Study of the Government's Efforts to Regulate Smoking on the Silver Screen, 21 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 205,210 (1998).
41. Id.
42. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388-89. Pittsburgh Press involved a complaint by The National
Organization for Women that alleged that the Pittsburgh Press violated a city ordinance prohibiting genderdesignated help-wanted columns. Id. The Court dismissed the newspaper's First Amendment challenge and
upheld the constitutionality of the city ordinance. Id. However, the Court specifically narrowed its holding
to illegal advertisements-gender-specific, nonexempt job opportunities. Id. at 391.
43. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
44. Id. at 697. In National Society, the Court held that a policy created by an association of
professional engineers which prohibited competitive bidding by the association's members was in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Id. Further, the Court did not find it a violation of the First Amendment
to prohibit the association from "adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline stating or
implying that competitive bidding is unethical." Id. at 696-97. The Court stated that the district court was
allowed to prohibit such conduct "to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences.
Id. at 697.
45. James, supra note 38, at415.
46. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
47. Id. at 811-12,829.
48. Id. at 828-29.

dismissed the rationale that such an advertisement did not deserve First
Amendment protection principally because it was a paid advertisement that
involved a commercial interest.49 Although the Court in Bigelow stressed that
advertising, as such, was not void of First Amendment protection, the Court
explicitly declined to address "the precise extent to which the First Amendment
permit[ted] regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may
legitimately regulate or even prohibit. 5 0 In the following term, for the first time,
the Supreme Court, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
ConsumerCouncil Inc., 51 overtly recognized the First Amendment as protecting
commercial speech.52 The Court affirmed the inference from Bigelow 53 that the
government could not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly
truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. ,1 4 Interestingly, the Court
employed a rather pro-capitalist rationale by indicating that the best method of
protecting consumers interests was through more, rather than less, information. 5
Although 1976 saw the Virginia Citizens Court conspicuously recognize
commercial speech under the First Amendment, the Court did nothing more than
provide limited examples of situations where commercial speech regulations were
permissible. 6 As a consequence, the Court failed to provide any significant
consistency or a level of scrutiny to apply in future cases.

49. Id. at 818. "The fact that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that
Chrestensenis authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune
from constitutional challenge." Id. at 819-20. Moreover, the Court, in a footnote, discussed Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Burger's discontent over the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech espoused in Valentine v. Christensen. See id. at 820 n.6.
50. Id. at 825.
51. 425 U.S. 748(1976). In Virginia Citizens, consumers of prescription drugs successfully challenged
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of
prescription drugs. Id. at 749-750. The state legislature contended that such a prohibition was necessary
in maintaining the professional standards of licensed pharmacists. Id. at 766.
52. Id. at 770. The Court added that simply because the speech involved was purely economic did not
disqualify the advertiser from First Amendment protection. Id. at 762.
53. However, the Court distinguished Virginia Citizens from Bigelow in that Bigelow involved a
sociallycontroversial activity that did more than simply propose acommercial transaction, whereas Virginia
Citizens involved more of a purely commercial activity. Id. at 760-61.
54. Id. at 773; Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,98 (1977) (stating that
the government may not impede "the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information" in the context
of prohibiting the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs).
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Va. Citizens, 425 U.S. at 765.
55. Va. Citizens,.425 U.S. at 766-70.
56. Id.at770-71.
57. Id. at 770-20.
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B. The CentralHudson Test
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York,58 espoused a First Amendment
jurisprudential standard that provided a benchmark by which all laws effecting
commercial speech would be analyzed.59 In CentralHudson, the Court held that
a New York Public Service Commission regulation, which banned all promotional
advertising by an electrical utility, violated the First Amendment. 6° In holding the
ban unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that the Constitution did not afford
commercial speech pure First Amendment protection. 6' The Court indicated that
the protection available for commercial speech rested on the "nature both of the
62
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation."
To preserve this relationship, the Court established a four-pronged standard
by pulling together some of the interests espoused in earlier cases. 63 In order to
determine whether the Commission's regulation violated the electrical company's
First Amendment rights, the Court adopted an analytical test that considered: (1)
whether the speech at issue is not misleading and concerns a lawful activity, and
(2) whether the state's interest in regulating such speech is substantial.' 4 If both
prongs are answered in the affirmative, then the court must also ask: (3) whether
the state's regulation directly advances the state's asserted interest, and (4)
whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary in effectuating the
state's interest. 65
In applying the newly bundled analysis to the facts of Central Hudson, the
Court first asserted that the utility's advertisements were truthful and concerned
a lawful activity.66 Next, the Court agreed that the Commission's two interests in
promoting energy conservation and establishing a fair rate were substantial.67 The
Court then determined that the ban directly advanced the Commission's interest
in reducing energy consumption, but could not agree that the Commission's ban

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 562-63.
Id.at 563.
Id. at 562-66.
Id. at 566.
Id.

Id.
id. at 568-69.

also did the same for establishing a fair rate structure.6 8 Under the fourth prong,
however, the Court concluded that there were many other less restrictive policies
the Commission could have employed to advance its interest in promoting
conservation.'
In controversies subsequent to CentralHudson, the self-titled test has been
classified and utilized as a mid-tier or intermediate level of scrutiny test for
determining a regulation's First Amendment constitutionality. 70 Thus, the Central
Hudson test lies in the constitutional abyss, somewhere between the deferential
rational basis test the Court uses for regulating health, safety, welfare, and morals
and the restrictive strict scrutiny test used for, inter alia, assessing pure First
Amendment speech interests. 71
C. Application of the CentralHudson Test
In the years following the Central Hudson decision, the Court utilized the
commercial speech analysis to strike down unconstitutional attempts to restrict
commercial speech.72 However, not all was settled in commercial speech
jurisprudence. The CentralHudson analysis began to exhibit some instability and
needed fine-tuning regarding the "fit" (prong three) and "scope" (prong four)
restrictions.73 The cases that follow identify the Court's inconsistency and tension
in determining the extent of protection afforded under the Central Hudson test.
In 1986, the Court in Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico 7 4 upheld the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited advertisements of casino gambling targeted at residents of Puerto Rico but not at
prospective tourists of Puerto Rico. 75 Interestingly, the Court gave great
deference to the government's factually unsubstantiated assertions under prong
three of Central Hudson: that prohibiting advertisements would decrease the
demand for casino gambling and decrease the parasitic evils that are allegedly
associated with casino gambling. 76 Additionally, the Court, under prong four of
68. Id. at 569. Under the third prong, the Court found that the Commission's interest was directly
advanced because "Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion
would increase sales." Id. at 569.
69. Id. at 570-71. Under the fourth prong, the Court found that the Commission failed to show that "a
more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the
[Commission's] interest." Id. at 570.
70. Diane Ritter, Note, The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Future of Tobacco
Advertising After 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1997).
71. Id. at 1511-13.
72. Id. at 1511.
73. See infra notes 74-78 and 85-90 and accompanying text.
74. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
75. Id.
at 330-31.
76. Id. at 341-42.
The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions.
. that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to
increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature's belief is a reasonable
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Central Hudson, again substantiated this deferential view by adding that "the
[legislature's] greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."77 As a result of
the Court's deferential stance under the third and fourth prong of CentralHudson,
the Court relegated the test from one of intermediate scrutiny to a more
deferential rational basis test. 78
In 1993, the Court handed down three significant commercial speech cases.79
Although all three cases were handed down in the same term, the significance lies
not in their sheer volume, but in the dissimilarity of the Court's application of the
Central Hudson test.
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., ° the Court struck down a
government ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of commercial handbills on
public property. 8 ' In Discovery Network, the Court declined to give deference to
the government's factually unjustifiable assertions that the regulation
"reasonabl[y] fit" the government's purpose. 2 The Court noted that the city's use
of the ordinance would merely remove 62 newsracks out of the existing 1,500 to
2,000. 8' The Court found that removing such a small number of newsracks would
do little to increase the city's interest in preserving aesthetics. '
In Edenfleld v. Fane,85 the Court struck down a Florida statute prohibiting
uninvited solicitation by certified public accountants.8 6 Consistent with the antideferential stance of Discovery Network, the Supreme Court noted that Central
Hudson required "Itihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial
speech carr[y] the burden of justifying it." 87 The Court also asserted that "[tihis
burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
one, and the fact that appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates
that appellant shares the legislature's view.
Id.
77. Id. at 346-47.
78.

See Ritter, supra note 70, at 1514-15.

79. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761 (1993); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).

80. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
81. ld.at424.
82. Id. at 417, 430. In an effort to promote the safety and esthetics of Cincinnati's city streets, the city
refused to renew the plaintiffs'-commercial publishers'-permits to display their commercial publications
using freestanding newsracks on public property. Id. at 412-14.
83.

Id. at414.

84. See id. at 454. "The city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers' newsracks
are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks." Id.
85. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
86. Id. at 763.
87. Id. at 770 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,71, n.20 (1983)).

the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree. ' '8 Specifically, the Court noted that although the Board of
Accountancy's interests were substantial, 9 the Board failed to substantiate that
the prohibition on solicitation furthered its interests. "
The Supreme Court appeared to be moving away from the Posadasrational
basis interpretation. However, two months after Fane, the Court decided United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.9' In Edge, the Court deferred to congressional
judgment by upholding a federal statute prohibiting lottery advertisements in nonlottery states.92 In assessing Edge under the "proper fit" prong of the Central
Hudson test, the Court stated that with commercial speech, the Court would
"allow room for legislative judgments."93 The Court stated, "Congress clearly was
entitled to determine that broadcast of promotional advertising of lotteries
undermines North Carolina's policy against gambling, even if the North
Carolina's audience is not wholly unaware of the lottery's existence." 94
Although Edge appeared to fall out of line regarding the appropriate degree
of deference under Central Hudson, in 1995, the Court, in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 95 reinforced its previous holding in Fane, which required that the
government assert its interest "in a direct and material way." 96 The Court in Rubin
struck down a portion of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that prohibited
beer labels from indicating alcohol content. 97 The Court found the government's
interest in suppressing the possibility of "strength wars" 98 unavailing in light of the
government's differing policy with regard to labels and advertising and contrary
policy with regard to wine and spirits. 99

88. Id. at 770-7 1.
89. Id. at 767. The Board of Accountancy identified that the ban on solicitation advanced the state's
interests in preventing fraud, maintaining the fact and appearance of CPA independence, and protecting a
client's privacy. Id. at 768.
90. The Court added that the Board of Accountancy presented nothing more than conclusory
statements-no studies or anecdotal evidence-to demonstrate that the ban on CPA solicitation advanced the
Board's interests in any direct or material way. Id. at 771-72.
91. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
92. Id. at 434,436. Edge operated a radio station licensed by the FCC in North Carolina, a non-lottery
state. Id. at 423. However, ninety-two percent of Edge's listening audience and ninety-five percent of
Edge's advertising revenue were generated from neighboring Virginia. Id. at 423-24. As a result, Edge
desired to advertise Virginia's state lottery. Id. at 424. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1304 prohibited Edge from
airing lottery advertisements from a non-lottery state, Edge sought declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief. Id.
93. Id. at 434 (citing Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
94. Id.
95. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
96. Id. at 487 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,767 (1993)).
97. Id. at 488.
98. The government asserted that without regulation, brewers would engage in competitive practices
in the marketplace by allowing beer labels to include their respective potencies. Id. at 479.
99. Id. at 487-88. Although the Court did not find the government's interests without merit, the Court
added that "[t]here is little chance that ... [the prohibition] can directly and materially advance its aim,
while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine and counteract its effects." Id. at 489.
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D. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: ° A Reconciliation?
In 1996, the Court in 44 Liquormart issued a fragmented and complicated
opinion, but seemed to settle the inconsistency that preceded it by elevating
Central Hudson into more of a restrictive test.' 1 44 Liquormart involved a
challenge by liquor retailers of a Rhode Island law that prohibited advertisements
of liquor prices. '02 After the Court determined that the Central Hudson analysis
applied to the 44 Liquonnart controversy,0 3 the Court proceeded to the pivotal
and much debated third and fourth prongs and determined that the State's
' °4
restriction was unconstitutional for failing to establish a "reasonable fit." '
Specifically, the Court iterated that Central Hudson's third prong required that a
state's regulation "significantly" advance its substantial interest, rather than
simply further it. °5 Furthermore, the Court added that mere speculation or
conjecture would not suffice to meet this requirement.'6 The Court added that the
fourth prong of CentralHudson required that the restriction not be more extensive
than necessary to achieve the state's objective. "o
More importantly, the Court also used 44 Liquormartdecision to defend and
dismiss the highly deferential language utilized in both the Edge'0 8 and Posadas
decisions, respectively. 1" 9 In particular, the Court maintained that the Posadas

100. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
101. See generally 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. 484 (1995).
102. ld. at491-93.
103. It is important to note that the following discussion of 44 Liquormart refers to the plurality opinion
of the Court, because a majority of the Justices could not agree on a uniform rationale. Id. at 488-89.
104. See id. at 504-08. The Court briefly maintained that the speech at issue was truthful, nonmisleading, and lawful, and summarily assertedthat the state's interest in promoting temperance was indeed
substantial. See id. at 504.
105. Id. at 505; see Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993); see supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text. Specifically, the Court stated that although the prohibition on price advertising may
have some effect on quelling the consumption of alcohol, the lack of findings of fact and evidentiary support
added little to suggest that the prohibition would "significantly" reduce alcohol consumption. 44
Liquormart,517 U.S. at 505-06.
106. 44 Liquormart 517 U.S. at 507. "Such speculation certainly does not suffice when the State takes
aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends." Id. See Fane, 507 U.S. at 770; see also
supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
107. 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 507. "It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that
would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting
temperance." Id.
108. The Court distinguished Edge by indicating that Edge referred to a regulation concerning illegal
conduct (lottery advertising broadcasted from a non-lottery state), while 44 Liquormartreferred to a speech
regulation concerning lawful behavior (price advertising). Id. at 508-09.
109. Id. at 508-14.

0
Court clearly erred in deferring to "legislative judgment."°"
The Supreme Court
also took the opportunity to dismiss the "greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning in
Posadas,which allowed the argument that because a state could constitutionally
ban the sale of liquor outright, the state could take the less intrusive step of simply
banning liquor advertising."' Finally, the 44 Liquormart Court refuted the
assumption inferred from Posadasand Edge-thatthe Supreme Court was willing
to accord more deference with regard to regulating "vices." 12
Although 44 Liquormart appeared to reconcile cases awaiting its decision, in
application, it did nothing more than contribute to more uncertainty as to the
restrictiveness of the Central Hudson test. In particular, what awaited the
commercial speech doctrine was a split among the circuits regarding the
constitutionality of section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934 (codified as
18 U.S.C. section 1304) which, inter alia, prohibits the broadcasting of casino
gambling advertisements on radio and television. 113

E. The History of Congress' Regulation of Gaming
Early on, Congress discouraged the operation of lotteries and prohibited the
dissemination of information about lotteries by the federal postal system 1 4 and
newspapers," 5 even when the lottery itself was supported by a state." 6 As radio
and television became more pervasive, Congress passed the Communications Act
of 1934,117 which prohibited any licensed radio or television station from
broadcasting lottery advertisements." 8 In 1950, Congress began to narrow the

applicability of section 1304 by excluding non-profit fishing contests from the
110. Id. at 509.
Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was 'up to the legislature' to choose suppression over
a less-speech-restrictive policy. The Posadasmajority's conclusion on that point cannot be
reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on
truthful, non-misleading advertising when non-speech related alternatives were available.
Id. at 509-10.
11l.Id. at 510 -11 (rejecting a similar argument made in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,
482-83, n.2). "The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts
to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct." Id. at 512.
112. Id. at 514. The Court maintained that if such an exception existed "[ailmost any product that poses
some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as
relating to 'vice activity."' Id.
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994).
114. Exparte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892) (stating that the demoralizing effect of lotteriesjustified
excluding such advertisements from the federal postal mails).
115. Id. (outlawing newspaper's advertisements of lotteries and prize lists).
116. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 for anti-lottery statutes.
117. 48 Stat. 1088, § 316 (1934) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1304).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1304. Specifically, the Act prohibited the following:
[A]ny advertisement ofor information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,
offering prizes dependent whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means ofany such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any
part or all of such prizes.
Id.
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broadcasting restriction because such contests were considered innocent
pastimes.l" 9 In 1975, Congress responded to the popularity of state-run lotteries
by exempting them from both the nationwide postal restrictions and the radio and
television restrictions when such advertisements are "broadcast by a radio or
television station licensed to a location in . . . a State which conducts such a
lottery." 20

In 1988, Congress excised another significant exemption by passing the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),"' which authorized tribal gambling in
any state where it was permitted. '22 IGRA also exempted tribes from the postal
and transportation restriction.123 More importantly, it exempted tribes from the
radio and television geographic restrictions.'24 Also in 1988, Congress passed the
Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act," 5 which extended the reach of
state-run lottery exemptions to include other lotteries or schemes not prohibited
by state law and conducted by: (1) a governmental entity; (2) a not-for-profit
entity; or (3) a commercial entity as a promotional activity, if such activity is
ancillary to the organization. 126
In 1992, Congress acted again by passing the Professional Amateur Sports
Prohibition Act, 2 7 which prohibited most sports-betting and advertising, but
included a variety of convoluted restrictions that did not apply to broadcasters,
regardless of geographic location. 128
F. Circuit Courts Disagree Over the Constitutionality of Prohibiting
PrivateLawful Casinosfrom Advertising
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United
States 129 invalidated a portion of 18 U.S.C. section 1304 because the statute's
numerous exceptions undermined the federal government's interest in materially
advancing its goal to "reduce public participation in all commercial lotteries,"
119. S. Rep. No. 81-2243, at 2 (1950).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(l)(B). Look to United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,428 (1993),
for the Supreme Court's clarification of the geographic restriction for broadcasting of radio and television.
See also supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
122. Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(B).
123. Id. at § 2720.
124. Id.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2) (1998).
126. Id. The § 1307 exemption also applies to state and locally conducted lotteries, and contains no
geographically limiting language, thus exempting them from the geographic restrictions in § 1304, as
clarified in United States v. Edge Broad.Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 3701-04 (1994).
128. Id. at § 3702.
129. 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).

therefore failing to satisfy CentralHudson. 30 The Ninth Circuit found the federal
government's interests in reducing public participation in commercial lotteries
and protecting those states that choose not to permit lotteries, although legitimate,
were insufficient to meet constitutional scrutiny in light of the government's
overall policy on gaming.'
The District Court of New Jersey in Players
International, Inc. v. United States'32 held the same portion of the statute
unconstitutional for similar reasons. 133
The Fifth Circuit in GreaterNew OrleansBroadcastingAss'n, Inc. v. United
States,34
' on the other hand, held the identical portion of the Act constitutional,
relying upon the Posadas decision.'35 However, on remand, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, the Fifth Circuit declined to adjust
its decision and analysis under the third prong of Central Hudson.'36 The court
maintained that 44 Liquormartdid not alter the third prong but simply required
greater scrutiny under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 117
G. The PossibilitiesAmidst the Confusion
Although the Court could revert back to its previous deferential stance and
allow Congress more leeway in advancing its substantial interests, the Court will
likely decline to lessen the scrutiny of the Central Hudson test in light of the
Court's plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart.3 s 44 Liquormart diminishes the
likelihood that the Court will revert back to the paternalistic language found in
Posadasand Edge and institute a rational basis type of test. "9 On the other hand,
the Court, noting that four Justices of the Court agree that commercial speech
deserves full protection when it is truthful and concerns a lawful activity, could
abolish the test in its entirety and confer upon commercial speech full First
Amendment protection. 140 However, it is conceivable that the Court will find a
position between both extremes and clarify the Central Hudson test in light of 44
Liquormart. 141

130. Id. at 1335-36.
131. Id. at 1334-36. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that although 44 Liquormart was a fragmented
plurality opinion, the ruling made the federal government's claim less likely to succeed. Id. at 1334.
132. 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997).
133. Id. at506-07.
134. 69 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated by, 519 U.S. 801 (1996) (mem.), affd, 149 F.3d 334 (5th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
135. Id. at 1300-02.
136. Greater New Orleans, 149 F.3d at 336-37.
137. Id.
138.

See Ritter, supra note 70, at 1519-20.

139. See id.
140. See John J. Walsh et al., Commentary, Supreme Court Should Strengthen Commercial Speech
Rights, 4 No. 1 ANDREWS GAMINGINDUS. LrrIG. REP. 11 (May 1999) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 501,526 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring)).
141. See supra notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
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IH. FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners were an association of Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") licensed radio and television broadcasters who operated in the New
Orleans metropolitan area of Louisiana.1 42 Petitioners desired to broadcast
promotional advertisements for privately operated, for-profit casinos in the state
of Louisiana, where gambling is legal.143 However, due to 18 U.S.C. § 1304 and
an FCC companion regulation,'" such commercial advertisements were prohibited
regardless of a station or casino's location. 145 As a result, the petitioners brought
a declaratory action challenging the application of section 1304 and the FCC
companion regulation and asked for injunctive relief, on the basis that the statute
and regulation violated the First Amendment as applied to the petitioners. 146
Petitioners subsequently initiated an action in the Eastern District Court of
Louisiana. 147 The District Court employed the commercial speech standard laid
down in Central Hudson and ruled in favor of the federal government. 48 The
court determined that the government's commercial speech restrictions were
appropriate given its substantial interests in quelling the demand for gambling and
its ancillary social costs, as well as protecting states that prohibit gambling as a
general policy. " On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the opinion of the district
court on similar grounds in a divided opinion."O While contemplating the
petitioner's writ of certiorari, the Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, '' in which the Court determined that many courts had too strictly applied
the standard under Central Hudson.'52 As a result, the Court granted the
broadcasters' petition, vacated the decision of the Fifth Circuit, and remanded the
case in light of the Court's clarification of the Central Hudson standard in 44
Liquormart."' The Fifth Circuit, on remand, while noting the stricter standard
under 44 Liquormart, adhered to its prior determination. 1 4 However, soon after

142.

Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 180.

143.

Id.

144.

18 U.S.C § 1304 (1994); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1998).

145.

Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 180-81 .

146.
147.

ld. at 181.
Id. Both parties agreed the case be summarily decided on their cross motions. Id.

148.

Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.

Id.
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 182 (citing 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 509-10).
Id.
Id. at 182-83.

the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 55 and the New
Jersey District Court. 6 reached contrary decisions regarding the application of 44
Liquormart.'57
Consequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1999 to determine
whether the First Amendment permits the federal government to regulate lawful
casino gambling by prohibiting non-misleading and truthful advertising about
such conduct.' 58
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens 5 9 began his analysis by
giving a brief synopsis of the history of Congress' position in regulating gaming
enterprises, including the dissemination of information regarding such
enterprises.16° Justice Stevens maintained that from the nineteenth century to
midway through the twentieth century, Congress adhered to a strict policy of
discouraging lotteries and the dissemination of material advancing such
activities.' 6' Moreover, the Supreme Court supported federal postal system
prohibitions of information on the subject based on "the notion that 'lotteries ..
. are supposed to have a demoralizing effect on people."' 62 Moreover, as
broadcasting and communications technology evolved and became profitable,
Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which extended the
prohibition of such demoralizing information to dissemination via radio and
television. 163
However, Justice Stevens mentioned that, in both 1950 and 1975, Congress
narrowed the applicability of their stance on gaming by excluding activities such
as non-profit fishing contests and state-run lotteries from the postal restrictions
and broadcast ban.' 4 Furthermore, Justice Stevens asserted that in 1988, through
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), Congress extended exemptions to
allow Indian tribes to conduct gaming activities, in addition to exempting them
from postal, transportation, and geographic broadcasting restrictions. 165
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
joined
160.
161.
162.
supra
163.
164.
165.

Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).
Players Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997).
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 183.
Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
in the opinion.
GreaterNew Orleans, 527 U.S. at 176-81.
Id. at 176; supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 176 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942));
notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177; supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S at 178; supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 178-79; supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Justice Stevens pointed out that, in 1988, Congress extended the 1950
state-run lottery exemptions through the Charity Advertising Clarification Act
("CACA").166 More importantly, unlike the state lottery exemptions granted in
1975, the CACA lifted the geographic restriction on broadcasting as applied to
casinos run by state and local governments.1 67 Moreover, in 1992 Congress
passed the Professional Amateur Sports Prohibition Act, which not only
proscribed sports betting and advertising but also included a variety of exceptions
that did not apply to broadcasters, regardless of geographic location. 168
After remarking on the differences between Congress' policy on gaming from
the beginning in 1934 to the present, Justice Stevens introduced the substantive
portion of the opinion by providing the four pronged analysis-as laid down in
Central Hudson-that is used to assess commercial speech:
At the outset, the court must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, a court must ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, the court
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. 169
Before introducing the Court's analysis under Central Hudson, Justice
Stevens acknowledged and dismissed the temptation to utilize the current
controversy to espouse broad constitutional pronouncements when the case at bar
could be fully decided on a much narrower basis-utilization of the Central
Hudson test. 70 Addressing the first prong of Central Hudson, Justice Stevens
acknowledged that both parties agreed that the variety of advertisements that the
petitioners attempted to broadcast were commercial in nature, not misleading, and
concerned a lawful activity, thereby satisfying the first prong under Central

166.

Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 179; supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.

167. Id.
168. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 179-80; see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
169. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 183. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). Justice Stevens clarified that it is the government's burden
to determine a substantial interest andjustify the challenged prohibition. Id. Moreover, he asserted that the
four prongs under the CentralHudson test are not entirely independent of one another, but are rather
interrelated-"[e]ach raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment inquiry,
but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three." Id. at 184.
170. Id.

Hudson. 7'
Under the second prong, Justice Stevens examined the federal government's
two "substantial interests" in restricting the broadcasters' attempted commercial
speech.' 72 The government argued that the restrictions satisfied two federal
interests: (1) reducing the social costs affiliated with gambling, and (2) aiding
73
states that prohibit casino gambling in effectuating their anti-gambling policy.
Although Justice Stevens recognized the interests of both the federal and state
governments in abating the social ills associated with gambling, Justice Stevens
pointed out that "[d]espite its awareness of the potential social costs, Congress has
not only sanctioned casino gambling for Indian tribes through tribal-state
compacts, but has enacted other statutes that reflect approval of state legislation
that authorizes a host of public and private gambling activities."' 7 4 Justice
Stevens further recognized that although "enacted congressional policy and
'governmental interests' are not necessarily equivalents for purposes of
commercial speech analysis," the federal government's unwillingness to adopt a
policy that endorsed either governmental interest severely weakened the
government's position. 75
'
Before addressing the substantive analysis under prongs three and four as
derived from Central Hudson, Justice Stevens clarified and specified the
government's burden under each prong. 176 Under the third prong, Justice Stevens
maintained that the government must prove that the speech restriction materially
advances its "substantial interests." 71 7 Justice Stevens stated that the government's
burden is not achieved by mere speculative assertions, but rather it is achieved by
showing "that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree.' ' 78 Under the fourth prong-a direct extension
of the third-Justice Stevens asserted that the government must then show that the
restriction is no more extensive than necessary to satisfy the federal government's
substantial interests.7 9 However, Justice Stevens maintained that this connection
does not dictate that the government employ a policy that is the "least restrictive
means conceivable," but rather a policy that is reasonable and in proportion with
171. Id. "[Pletitioners' broadcasts presumably would disseminate accurate information as to the
operation of market competitors, such as pay-out ratios, which can benefit listeners by informing their
consumption choices and fostering price competition." Id. at 184-85.
172. Id. at 185.
173. Id. The government suggested that "gambling contributes to corruption and organized crime;
underwrites bribery, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal conduct; imposes a regressive tax on the poor;
and 'offers a false but sometimes irresistible hope of financial advancement."' id. (quoting Brief for
Respondents 15-16).
174. Id. at 186-87 Justice Stevens remarked that "[wihatever its character in 1934 when § 1304 was
adopted, the federal policy of discouraging gambling in general, and casino gambling in particular is now
decidedly equivocal." Id. at 187.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 188.
177. Id.
178. id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,770-71 (1993)).
179. Id.
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the government's interest. 180
As to the government's first substantial interest, the federal government
alleged that allowing private, for-profit casino advertising would increase its
demand, thus increasing the social costs stemming from the activity.' Justice
Stevens asserted that although it is reasonable to assume that advertising would
cause the demand for casinos to increase, it is also reasonable to assume that such
advertisements would cause gamblers to choose one casino over the other. 182
Moreover, in light of the inconsistencies and exemptions originating from the
statute,' 83 coupled with a FCC policy that contradicts the government's asserted
interest in lessening the "costs" of gambling, 184 Justice Stevens asserted that
the Government is committed to prohibiting accurate product information, not commercial enticements of all kinds, and then only when
conveyed over certain forms of media and for certain types of gambling-indeed, for only certain brands of casino gambling-and despite the
fact that messages about the availability of such gambling are being
conveyed over the airwaves by other speakers. 185
Furthermore, Justice Stevens found unpersuasive the government's practice
of "pegging" the speech of casinos based on the casino owners. 186 He pointed out
that the only significant distinguishing characteristic between tribal casinos and
non-tribal casinos is the fact that tribal casinos are heavily regulated.' 7 Justice
Stevens alleged that if this factor contributed to mitigating the social ills of
gambling, one would think that Congress would have adopted a similar policy
with regard to unregulated casinos before abridging the speech rights of private
180.

Id.

181. Id. Moreover, the government alleged that compulsive gamblers are especially prone to the
"pervasiveness and potency" of gambling advertisements. Id.
182. Id. "More important, any measure of the effectiveness of the Government's attempt to minimize
the social costs of gambling cannot ignore Congress' simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling,
which may well be growing at a rate exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that
private casino advertising could produce." Id.
183. Under current law, a private casino may not advertise, regardless of the casino's location, whereas
tribal casinos and other enterprises sanctioned by statute, may advertise anywhere, regardless of a state's
general anti-gambling policy. Id. at 190.
184. "[Tlhe FCC has permitted broadcasters to tempt viewers with claims of 'Vegas-style excitement'
at a commercial 'casino,' if 'casino' is part of the establishment's proper name and the advertisement can
be taken to refer to the casino's amenities, rather than directly promote its gaming aspects." Id. at 190-91.
Although the FCC attempts to save certain speech though its interpretation, its general effect runs counter
to the governmental proffered interests. Id. at 191.
185. Id.
186. Id. The government cites the general welfare needs oftribes, however, acknowledges no differences
between the services offered at for profit casinos and tribal casinos. Id.
187. Id.

casinos.'88 He acknowledged that while a lack of direct regulation of casino
garqbling by Congress does not summarily compromise the constitutionality of
the restriction, the regulation does nothing to bolster the government's justification. "9
Viewing the prohibition of the petitioner's attempted speech in the context
of Congress' overall regulatory position, Justice Stevens asserted that the
prohibition of the petitioner's attempted conduct would not directly advance the
government's substantial interest.' 9° Moreover, the idea that Congress has less
intrusive policies available to effectuate its interests weakens the government's
position. 191
Justice Stevens agreed that although some justification existed for treating
non-Indian businesses differently than tribal enterprises, it did not directly follow
that this should dictate differing treatment of their First Amendment rights.' 92
Justice Stevens reasoned that "the power to prohibit or to regulate a particular
conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech
about that conduct. "'9 Justice Stevens concluded his analysis of the government's
first proffered substantial interest by stating that "[elven under the degree of
scrutiny that we have applied in commercial speech cases, decisions that select
among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are in serious tension with
the principles undergirding the First Amendment." "
In addressing the federal government's second interest in protecting states
that outlaw private casino gambling, Justice Stevens summarily stated that "[we
cannot see how this broadcast restraint, ambivalent as it is, might directly and
adequately further any state interest in dampening consumer demand for casino
gambling if it cannot achieve the same goal with respect to the similar federal
interest."' 95 Furthermore, Justice Stevens elaborated that even if a state interest
is more pressing than the federal government's interest, the statute at bar
"sacrifices an intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct when
compared to all of the policies at stake and the social ills that one could

188. Id.
189. Id. at 192.
There surely are practical and non-speech-related forms of regulation-including a prohibition
or supervision of gambling on credit; limitations on the use of cash machines on casino
premises; controls on admissions; pot or betting limits; location restrictions; and licensing
requirements-thatcould more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costsofcasino
gambling.
Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
at 193.
192. Id.
193. Id. "It is well settled that the First Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of government restrictions
on speech than of its regulation of commerce alone." Id. (citing Bd.of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
194. Id. at 193-94.
at 194.
195. Id.
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reasonably hope such a ban to eliminate." 196
Justice Stevens concluded that the government failed to meet its burden under
Central Hudson, thus leaving the audience to assess the value of the nonmisleading, accurate information concerning lawful conduct. 97 Additionally,
Justice Stevens left open the possibility that if the government adopted a coherent
policy, or accommodated the right of those broadcasters where such conduct is
legal, the case may have turned out differently. "'
B. Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a concurring opinion.'99 The Chief Justice
suggested that if Congress were to establish a substantive regulation of the
gambling industry not so riddled with exceptions, then section 1304 would past
constitutional muster. 20
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered a concurring opinion in which he concurred only
with the judgment. 2° In his opinion, Justice Thomas relied on his concurrence in
44 Liquonnart,in which he stated that where a "government's interest is to keep
legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
in the marketplace," the Central Hudson analysis is per se illegitimate. 202
V. IMPACT
A. JudicialImpact
The Supreme Court resolved the confusion between the Ninth and Second
Circuits. 23 The level of proof required under the Central Hudson test is now
solidified as a more restrictive test. The Court strengthened the third prong of the
Central Hudson test by maintaining that the interests in abridging commercial
speech must be "real" and must "materially advance" the government's substantial
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,767 (1993)).
198. Id. at 195.
199. Id. at 196-97 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 197. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
202. Id.; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in
Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring in the judgment).
203. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).

interests. 2°4 The Court also strengthened the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test by requiring that the speech abridgment be no more extensive than necessary
to satisfy the proffered substantial interests.20 5 In particular, the fourth prong
requires that the consistency of a government regulatory interest be considered as
a whole to determine if the government could advance its interest through a less
intrusive non-speech alternative. 206
The Court, however, never squarely addressed the geographic limitations of
private, lawful casino advertising.2 7 Although it is clear that private, lawful
casinos can broadcast from states where such conduct is legal,208 the question
remains whether gaming enterprises' advertisements can be broadcast anywhere,
regardless of the particular policy of the state where such information originates.
The problem with the pre-GreaterNew Orleans congressional inconsistencies
regarding casino advertising as a whole appear to be continuing in this issue of
geographic limitations.2 °9 On one hand, tribal casinos can advertise anywhere,
including states where such conduct is legal.210 The same applies to state or
locally conducted casinos2"' and those other activities that come under the Charity
Games Advertising Clarification Act2 2 and the 1992 Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act. 213 Thus, Congress permits nationwide gaming advertisements, regardless of where such advertisements originate, for some entities but
not for private lawful casinos. Although the Court only applied the GreaterNew
Orleans restrictions in that specific situation, the question remains whether it
should matter where an advertisement originates. Interestingly, the Department
of Justice and the FCC have recently solved the dilemma for the time being,
agreeing not to enforce the geographic restrictions.2 4 United States v. Edge, on
the other hand, which was repeatedly cited in GreaterNew Orleans, disallowed
the broadcast advertising of lotteries that originated from a state where such
conduct was illegal, but permitted broadcast advertising of lotteries that originated
204.
205.
206.
text.
207.
208.
text.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 188; see also supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188; see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 192-93; see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. 192-93; see also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 193-95; see also supra notes 197-98 and accompanying

See infra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
25 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. 2000); see also supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 1307 (a)(2)(2000); see also supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. §1307 (a)(2) (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 3701-02 (1994); see also supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
In light of the Greater New Orleans decision,
[t]he Department of Justice and the FCC subsequently filed a brief in a case before the Third
Circuit (Players International v. United States [citation omitted]) indicating that they will no
longer seek to enforce federal laws banning casino gambling advertisements, whether the
broadcaster who transmits the ad is located in a state that permits or prohibits casino gambling.
Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Recent Developments in Advertising Law, 1148 PRACTIcING L. INST. 7, 14 (1999),
available in Westlaw at 1148 PLI/Corp 7. Because the Supreme Court's ruling in Greater New Orleans
involved a federal statute, a similar question may remain regarding a similarly situated state law. Id. at 15.
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from a state where such conduct was legal.2"5 GreaterNew Orleans appears to
challenge Edge's validity, even though the Court never squarely called Edge into
question. Noting that lotteries and casinos are both gaming activities, it becomes
difficult to reconcile Edge and lottery advertisements with the congressional
inconsistency in the realm of casino gaming broadcast restrictions.
In GreaterNew Orleans, the Court opted not to raise the CentralHudson test
to the compelling state interest scrutiny utilized in assessing content-based
abridgments. However, in application, all commercial speech concerning a
truthful and lawful activity will successfully demand such First Amendment
protection." 6 Justice Thomas' foresight in 44 Liquormart,and the same rationale
to which he tersely allude in GreaterNew Orleans, may serve as the beacon for
the abolition of the commercial speech doctrine as case after case is struck down
for attempting to regulate lawful and truthful commercial speech without initially
regulating the underlying conduct.
[T]he Court's holding [referring to 44 Liquormart] will in fact be quite
sweeping if applied consistently in future cases. The opinions would
appear to commit the courts to striking down restrictions on speech
whenever a direct regulation ... would be an equally effective method
of dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that directly
banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or
otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be
at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting
advertising regarding the product would be, and thus virtually all
restrictions with such
a purpose would fail the fourth prong of the
21 7
CentralHudson test.
Time will ultimately tell whether Justice Thomas' rationale regarding the
application of the commercial speech doctrine will eventually come to fruition
and serve as the crux for a future majority opinion. However, that time may be
forthcoming as tobacco advertisement curtailments are likely challenged and
litigated.2"8 The tobacco controversy may serve as a litmus test for Justice
Thomas' pragmatic prophecy.

215. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,434-35.
216. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 293-94 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
519 (1996)).
217. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring
in judgment).
218. See infra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.

B. Legislative Impact
The GreaterNew Orleans decision sends the message to Congress that any
future attempts at regulating the speech of any "vice" activity1 9 (e.g., alcohol,
gambling, tobacco, and possibly marijuana) is non-availing.220 Moreover, Greater
New Orleanssignals to Congress that it may enter the market only after Congress
first attempts to advance its "substantial interest" through non-speech alternatives.
As a result, Congress is faced with the daunting task of attempting to censor
truthful advertisements that may aid consumers in comparing prices or introducing them to lawful services.22' In particular, the Court suggested that if Congress
wishes to restrict the gambling advertisements of private casinos, Congress must
develop a concerted underlying policy to justify the existence of such a
regulation.222 Thus, the Court has not wholeheartedly dismissed Congress' role
in commercial speech regulation, but rather, it has made it more difficult for
Congress to influence consumer choice by limiting what consumers see and hear.
Many critics tout the Greater New Orleans decision as means to resurrect
tobacco advertising.223 Before GreaterNewOrleans,many proponents of banning
tobacco advertising claimed that because tobacco was considered a "vice,"
tobacco advertisements received less First Amendment protection than other
products or services. 224 However, cigarettes are a lawful product and consumers
could arguably benefit from knowing the nicotine and tar content when making
a purchase.225 What stands in the way of tobacco companies lining up at the
courthouse steps with GreaterNew Orleansin their back pocket is the settlement
agreements that tobacco companies recently reached with several state attorneys
general.226 Under the settlement agreements, tobacco companies "voluntarily"
assented to many advertising restrictions and agreed to waive their First
Amendment rights in exchange for limited liability benefits.227 Although the
219. If there was any doubt after 44 Liquormart that "vices" received any special treatment, see supra
note 109 and accompanying text, Greater New Orleans belies the proposition that a "vice" is a selfdeterminative term in First Amendment jurisprudence.
220. Doug Halonen, Will Casino Ads Lead to Liquor?, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 21, 1999, at 3,
available at 1999 WL 8766563; Jan Crawford Greenburg, Top Court Rescinds Ad Bans on Private
Casinos, CHI. TIm., June 15, 1999, at 4, availableat 1999 WL 2883446.
221. See Warren Richey, Courtputs gambling back on the airwaves;Supreme Courtfindstoo many
flaws in law, allows casino ads on TV, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 15, 1999, at 3, available at
1999 WL 5380065.
222. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193-96 (1999); Daniel E.
Troy, Banning Ads Just Got Harder,WALL ST. J., June 21, 1999, at A27 [hereinafter "Troy, Banning
Ads"].
223. Troy, Banning Ads, supra note 222, at A27.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Id. See, e.g. MasterSettlement Agreement, at http://www.lawpublish.com/settle.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2001).
227. Troy, Banning Ads, supra note 222, at A27.
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tobacco companies "voluntarily" agreed to waive their First Amendment rights,
the question over the constitutionality of tobacco advertising may not be a moot
issue.2"' Questioning the constitutionality of the conditions to which they have
"voluntarily" agreed becomes the predicate issue.229 Tobacco companies would

have to prove that they were coerced into waiving their First Amendment rights
utilizing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.23° If employed, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may complicate any voluntary agreement affecting
tobacco companies' rights under the First Amendment. 231
Noting that the government's interest in tobacco advertisements centers
around the notion that they are "not good," Congress must heed the Court's

determination that the primary reason for restricting commercial speech is to
ensure that advertisements are not misleading. 232

Furthermore, Congress

maintains that it has an interest in protecting minors from tobacco advertisements
because such advertising condones an illegal act. 233 However, the Court opines
that restricting commercial speech should be the last response in any regulatory
scheme, even when it pertains to a vulnerable group. 34 While the government has

a substantial interest in protecting minors, it may not advance broad regulations
that impair the free flow of truthful information regarding lawful products for
adults.235
228. See generally Barbara A. Noah, ConstitutionalQualms ConcerningGovernmentalRestrictions
on Tobacco Product Advertising, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 637, 650-51 (1998).
229. Id.
230. Id. (setting forth the constitutional conditions doctrine as applied to tobacco advertising).
231. Id.
232. Troy, Banning Ads, supra note 222, at A27.
233. Id. But see generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)
(striking down casino advertising ban without raising the applicability to minors' interest and susceptibility);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1995) (striking down alcohol advertising restriction
without raising the applicability to minors' interest and susceptibility).
234. The Court has stated:
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials. See Ginsberg [v. New York,] 390 U. S., [629,] at 639 [(1968)];
[Federal Communications Comm'n v.] Pacifica [Found.], 438 U. S., [726,] 749 [(1978). "But
that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.
As we have explained, the Government may not "reduc[e] the adult population... to... only
what is fit for children." Denver [Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n], 518 U.S. [727] at 759 [(1996)] (internal quotation marks
omitted)(quoting Sable [Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n],
492 U. S., [ 1151 at 128 [(1989)]). "[R]egardless of the strength of the government's interest"
in protecting children, "[tihe level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to
that which would be suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.
S. 60, 74-75 (1983).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,875 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 that criminalized the transmission of material deemed "harmful to minors" over the Internet).
235. See Solange E. Bitol, Commentary, Marketing Restriction in Tobacco Legislation are
Unconstitutional,13 No. 12 ANDREWs TOBACCO INDUSTRY LITIGATION REP. 18 (1998).

Moreover, GreaterNew Orleansdictates, under the fourth prong of Central
Hudson, that Congress address the root of any problem before considering the
restriction of speech to be a viable alternative.236 Thus, before Congress can assert

that commercial speech is its last response, Congress may want to try its hand at
better enforcement-a more direct way of regulating the problem. 2 7 For example,
when existing laws are enforced, underage smoking is no longer an issue because

minors may not purchase or acquire cigarettes. 238 In addition to direct regulation,
Congress may enter the marketplace of ideas via counterspeech and educate
minors about the potential health and legal risks of smoking. 239
C. Social Impact
Prior to the GreaterNew Orleansdecision, casinos could only advertise the
non-gaming aspects of their enterprise. 240 As a result of GreaterNew Orleans,
private casinos are able to. unequivocally advertise information regarding the
gaming aspects of their casinos and consumers are free to choose how they want
to spend and gamble their money. 241
If commentators are correct in believing that geographic restriction do not
apply to private casino advertising, 42 then casinos will have a national market at
their disposal. As alluded to earlier, however, the Department of Justice and the
FCC may have rendered this question moot with regard to the enforcement of
federal law. 23 Even if geographic restrictions did apply, it is still likely that
gaming establishments would see more profits, due to the more pervasive
advertising mediums at their disposal. However, casinos maintain that the public
may not immediately see "beefed up" radio and television advertisement
campaigns, but instead may see a shift from print ads to radio and television

236. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
238. If the government could prove that its attempts at regulating the underlying conduct were
unsuccessful then it is possible that targeting tobacco advertising may serve as the last resort in advancing
the government's substantial interest in protecting minors. See Andrew S. Gollin, Comment, Improving the
Odds ofthe Central Hudson Balancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort, 81 Marq.
L. Rev. 873, 911-12 (1998). See also Oral Argument for Greater New Orleans v. United States, available
at 1999 WL 274986, *22-23; David C. Vladeck & John Cary Sims, Why the Supreme Courtwill Uphold
StrictControlson TobaccoAdvertising, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 651,664-65 (1998) (stating that the government
has eviscerated its non-speech alternatives in protecting minors from smoking). But see Troy, Banning Ads,
supra note 222, at A27 (stating that the government could deal with the problem of underage smoking more
appropriately through stronger enforcement of access laws or depriving violators caught smoking of their
drivers licenses).
239. Gollin, supra note 238, at 913-14.
240. Greenburg, supra note 220, at 4; Oral Argument for Greater New Orleans v. United States,
available at 1999 WL 274986, *26-29. See also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. Id.; Richey, supra note 221, at 3. But see Halonen, supra note 220, at 3 (stating that it is unclear
over the geographic restriction).
243. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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advertisements. 2"

Casinos acknowledge that television advertising is too costly and its effect is too
difficult to measure.245 Some casinos allege that the public will also see little
change because of the recent advertising trend that markets casinos as "more than
casinos," attracting a wider audience without alluding to the gaming aspects of the
casino."
Critics argue that GreaterNew Orleans places our society one step closer
towards a complete acceptance of gambling and its associated social costs. 247
Moreover, protecting children from the social ills of gambling will no doubt
become more of an issue, given the pervasiveness of advertising on radio and
2 48
television.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although it appears that the Supreme Court has at least indirectly validated
American capitalism and the free-market by allowing more information to enter
the marketplace, federalism interests have definitely waned due to the ability of
information to cross state borders from a single location. What is illegal in one
jurisdiction may well be commonplace in all other jurisdictions. Moreover, as
commercial information finds the path of least resistance through mediums such
as cable, satellites, and the Internet, the Court is on its way to granting truthful,
non-misleading advertisements full First Amendment protection. If Justice
Thomas' concurrence is any indication, the practical result of the CentralHudson
test, as it stands, may in effect give de facto full First Amendment protection to
truthful, non-misleading commercial advertisements. It appears, however, that
any significant, overt abolition of the commercial speech doctrine will not surface
with the present Court.249 Nevertheless, if GreaterNew Orleans is to stand for
244. Halonen, supra note 220, at*3.
245. Casinos react to a Supreme Court ruling, BUs. NEWS N.J., June 21, 1999, at 11,available at
1999 WL 11719220.

246. Id.
247. Richey, supranote 221, at 3.
248. See id.
249. It appeared that Justice Stevens tempered his disposition on commercial speech from his opinion
in 44 Liquormartto his opinion in GreaterNew Orleans to solidify a majority of the Court on the issue
of commercial speech, rather than risk treading new ground and another fragmented opinion. See Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182, 184, 187-89, 193 (1999); 44 Liquormart

anything, it emphatically sends a message to Congress that limiting consumer
choice through

restricting truthful, non-misleading speech will no longer serve as a plausible
option for regulating an entire industry without first regulating the underlying
conduct.
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